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Summary. – We examine the idea that aid and FDI are complementary sources of foreign 
capital. We argue that the relationship between aid and FDI is theoretically ambiguous: aid 
raises the marginal productivity of capital when used to finance complementary inputs (like 
public infrastructure and human capital investments), but aid may crowd out private 
investments when it comes in the shape of pure physical capital transfers. Empirically, we 
find that aid invested in complementary inputs draws in FDI, while aid invested in physical 
capital crowds it out. The paper shows that the composition of aid matters for its overall level 
of efficiency. 
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Does Foreign Aid increase Foreign Direct Investment? 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The notion that foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) are complementary sources of 
capital is conventional among governments and international cooperation agencies. For 
instance, the UN's 2002 Monterrey Consensus on International Financing for Development 
affirms that "ODA [Official Development Aid] plays an essential role as a complement to 
other sources of financing for development, especially in those countries with the least 
capacity to attract private direct investment. A central challenge, therefore, is to create the 
necessary domestic and international conditions to facilitate direct investment flows, 
conducive to achieving national development priorities, to developing countries, particularly 
Africa, least developed countries, small island developing States, and landlocked developing 
countries, and also to countries with economies in transition." (UN, 2002, p. 9).
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However, the implicit presumption in the consensus that ODA has a "catalyzing" effect on 
FDI, or that aid and FDI are complements, is by no means evident. For example, Kosack and 
Tobin (2006) argue that aid and FDI are essentially unrelated, because aid is basically 
oriented to support the government budget and finance investments in human capital, while 
FDI is a private sector decision relatively more connected to physical capital. In a more 
general study, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) estimate the marginal product of capital ( MPK ) 
across countries and find that, accounting for the contribution of land and other natural 
resources to income generation, "[...] the return from investing in capital is no higher in poor 
countries than in rich countries." (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007, p. 537). One of the implications of 
their study is that increasing aid inflows to developing countries will lower the MPK  in these 
economies and will tend to be fully offset by outflows of other types of capital investments 
(Caselli and Feyrer, 2007, p. 540). If this is the case, aid and FDI are clearly closer to being 
substitutes rather than being complements. 
 
This paper presents a unified framework for assessing the relative merit of these different 
claims. We analyze the relationship between aid and FDI in a theoretical framework that 
                                                            
1 See the 2007 Paris Declaration Aid Effectiveness, or the 2011 UNCTAD Policy Focus, available at 
www.unctad.org/en/docs/aldcafricapf2011d1_en.pdf, for more recent examples. 
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distinguishes between aid directed towards complementary factors of production and aid 
invested in physical capital. This distinction serves to illustrate, on the one hand, that aid 
invested in complementary factors increases MPK  in the recipient country, which tends to 
draw in additional foreign resources and helps to sustain a higher level of capital over time. 
For example, aid can ease important bottlenecks in poor countries by financing public 
infrastructure and human capital investments that would not have been undertaken by private 
actors (due to the free-riding problem in financing public goods for instance), nor by public 
agents (for example because of the budgetary constraints that prevent aid-recipient 
governments from undertaking this type of investments). On the other hand, the distinction 
also helps to illustrate that foreign aid invested in physical capital competes directly with 
other types of capital, and thus replaces investments that private actors would have 
undertaken anyway. In this case, capital mobility and rate-of-return equalization across 
countries will give rise to a flight of other types of capital after an aid flow has been received. 
 
This framework provides a number of testable predictions. First, for a given level of domestic 
saving, aid invested in physical capital crowds out other types of foreign investments in 
physical capital, one for one. Second, aid invested in complementary factors of production has 
an ambiguous net effect on FDI. The logic of the ambiguity is that, while an increase in 
complementary factors increases MPK  and attracts additional foreign investments, the 
productivity increase also raises income, domestic savings and domestic investments, which 
tends to lower MPK  and thus crowd out foreign investments. These two findings suggest that 
the overall impact of aid on FDI is in theory indeterminate, and that the composition of aid 
matters. 
 
We take the implications of our theoretical analysis to the data utilizing a panel of 99 
countries over the period 1970-2001 for which we have disaggregated data. We find a large 
and positive effect of aid invested in complementary factors, while aid invested in physical 
capital has a negative impact on FDI. The combined impact of these two types of aid on FDI 
remains positive, so our results imply that more aid should be directed towards inputs 
complementary to physical capital to optimize the return on aid. The results are robust to (1) a 
broader definition of complementary aid than that adopted in the benchmark estimations, (2) 
allowing for imperfect capital mobility, and (3) controlling for traditional FDI correlates and 
regional fixed effects. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the scarce theoretical and empirical 
literature on aid and FDI. Section 3 describes our theoretical framework. Section 4 presents 
our empirical strategy, describes the data and discusses relevant econometric. Section 5 shows 
the results, and Section 6 tests their robustness. Section 7 sums up and discusses policy 
implications. 
 
2. THE LITERATURE ON AID AND FDI 
 
The relationship between aid and FDI is controversial and research results on it remain 
inconclusive. To our knowledge, only six papers analyze the question empirically. Harms and 
Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan et al. (2005) analyze the relationship between aid and FDI for a 
broad sample of developing countries. Karakaplan et al. (2005) find that aid has a negative 
direct effect on FDI and that both good governance and financial market development 
significantly improve the impact of aid on subsequent flows of FDI. Harms and Lutz (2006), 
on the other hand, find that once they control for the regulatory burden in the host country, aid 
works as a complement to FDI and, surprisingly, that the catalyzing effect of foreign aid is 
stronger in countries that are characterized by an unfavorable institutional environment. 
 
Kimura and Todo (2010) and Blaise (2005) present case studies on Japanese FDI and aid 
flows, and report incongruent results. While Blaise (2005) finds positive effects from aid to 
infrastructure projects, Kimura and Todo (2010) find no positive infrastructure effect, no 
negative rent-seeking effect but a positive vanguard effect (arising when foreign aid from a 
particular donor country promotes FDI from the same country but not from other countries). 
Two other case studies, Bhavan, Xu and Zhong (2011) and Carro and Larrú (2011), find that 
aid attracts FDI in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and India; and that the evidence is 
inconclusive in the cases of Argentina and Brazil, respectively. 
 
We believe that this type of mixed results can be explained to a large extent by the high level 
of aggregation used for the aid variable. Karakaplan et al. (2005) and Bhavan, Xu and Zhong 
(2011) include only overall ODA. Harms and Lutz (2006) distinguish between grants, 
technical cooperation grants, as well as bilateral and multilateral aid, but it remains unclear 
why one would expect foreign investors to react differently to these types of aid. Kimura and 
Todo (2010) apply the idea of different types of aid but do not implement an effective 
disaggregation: they rely on a proxy for aid for infrastructure that takes the bulk of total aid 
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(namely aid for economic and social infrastructure, production and multisector activities), and 
a proxy for aid for non-infrastructure that contains the most volatile part of aid (food and 
humanitarian aid, and aid related to debt). 
 
A general shortcoming in this literature is also the lack of consensus on the specification of 
the FDI relation (Bloningen and Piger, 2011). None of the cited empirical papers are 
supported by a theoretical model.
2
 One reason might be that the only paper analyzing 
theoretically the relationship between aid and FDI is Beladi and Oladi (2007) – who set up a 
general equilibrium model where all foreign aid is used to finance public goods, but where 
they unfortunately do not consider any further disaggregation for the aid flows nor make an 
empirical analysis. 
 
This paper closes this gap by proposing a simple theoretical model for the relationship 
between different types of aid and FDI in a small open economy, which constitutes the base 
for our empirical analysis. We describe the main elements and mechanisms in the next section 
(a formal presentation is given in the appendix). 
 
3. A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF AID AND FDI 
 
Assume a Solow setup for a small open economy, where output per capita, y , grows with (a) 
the accumulation of physical capital per capita, k  (financed by domestic and foreign 
investments), and (b) improvements in total factor productivity, A  (which includes any factor 
complementary to the accumulation of physical capital per capita, like new technologies and 
better institutions); such that Aky  . 
 
                                                            
2 More generally, analyzing why development economics needs theory, Acemoglu (2010) argues that 
development economics essentially "investigates the causes of poverty and low incomes around the 
world and seeks to make progress in designing policies that could help individuals, regions, and 
countries to achieve greater economic prosperity", and that "[…] Economic theory plays a crucial role 
in this endeavor, not only because it helps us focus on the most important economic mechanisms, but 
also because it provides guidance on the external validity of econometric estimates, meaning that it 
clarifies how we can learn from specific empirical exercises about the effects of similar shocks and 
policies in different circumstances and when implemented on different scales." (Acemoglu, 2010, p. 
17). 
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Assume that foreign aid is composed by two types of flows, which contribute to the described 
process of growth in two different ways: one part of aid helps to increase the amount of 
physical capital k , and the other helps to increase the amount of complementary factors or 
total factor productivity A . (As an example of two types of aid imagine, for instance, aid 
projects to modernize agriculture or other specific productive sector, and aid projects to 
improve the quality of public institutions.)
3
 
 
If international mobility of capital is unrestricted, the return to investments in physical capital 
(the MPK ) should be the same across countries. If this is the case, as Caselli and Feyrer 
(2007) estimate in their paper, any inflow of foreign capital should tend to reduce the MPK  
in the recipient country and will tend to crowd out other sources of capital. Assuming that one 
part of foreign aid is effectively used to finance projects that could have been financed by 
private (foreign or domestic) investors, a direct implication is that, controlling for domestic 
sources of capital (domestic savings), an increase in the flow of aid used to make investments 
in physical capital will tend to crow out FDI.
4
 
 
In turn, the effect of aid directed to increase complementary factors is in principle positive: 
foreign aid that is used to finance reforms, better institutions or better producing technologies, 
will increase the MPK  and will tend to attract additional FDI. But interestingly, given that an 
increase in complementary factors also increases the aggregate level of income, in the context 
                                                            
3 Aid has typically been thought to finance only public type of goods, but there is compelling evidence 
that aid also finances projects that could have been financed by foreign (or domestic) private investors, 
in areas with or without initial private investors' initiative or interest. One example of this is the 
Danish Development Agency's Business Development programs ("Private Sector Development", 
"Business to Business for Development", "Innovative Partnerships for Development"), which since 
1993 have supported the establishment of commercial establishments and partnerships between 
Danish companies and companies in many developing countries in areas like organic farming and 
agriculture, IT and programming, clothing, and tourism, among others. A second, larger and more 
recent example is USAID's Private Sector Development program for Iraq, "Izdihar" ("prosperity" in 
Arabic), which encourages private sector institutions and reforms, the establishment of a stock 
exchange, and the support of a number of private banks and microfinance institutions. Visit for 
example 
www.danidadevforum.um.dk/en/menu/Topics/GrowthAndEmployment/BusinessDevelopment, and 
www.usaid.gov/iraq/accomplishments/privsec.html.  
4 An interesting corollary is that the relationship between domestic savings and FDI has the same 
features as the one between this type of aid and FDI: controlling for other sources of capital, a larger 
amount of domestic savings tends to reduce the marginal returns to capital accumulation, and thereby 
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of a Solow economy (where domestic savings are determined by the country's level of 
income), we should also observe an increase in the level of domestic savings and domestic 
investments, which will tend to lower the MPK  in the country and thereby reduce the amount 
of additional FDI attracted to the country. Therefore, the net effect of aid to complementary 
factors on FDI is in theory ambiguous: it will be the result of combining the positive effects 
via higher total factor productivity, with the negative effects via larger availability of 
domestic sources of capital. 
 
The two counterbalancing effects from aid to complementary factors are both of first order, so 
the final effect of this type of aid will depend on its existing level. In contrast, the effect of aid 
for physical capital investments will not operate with this type of scale effects, because its 
relationship with FDI is pinned down by the assumption of unrestricted capital mobility, 
through equalization of the level of MPK  across countries. (We relax the assumption of 
unrestricted capital mobility as a robustness check later, and consider the case where the 
MPK  differs across countries in a measure that reflects each country's idiosyncratic risks.) 
 
A key implication of the analysis is that the effect of total aid on FDI is in theory ambiguous, 
because it is the combined effect of aid for physical capital investments and aid to 
complementary factors. This is an important result because it offers a simple explanation for 
why empirical studies that do not disaggregate aid flows tend to find insignificant or 
ambiguous effects, and provides a clear theoretical basis for the idea that the composition of 
aid matters for its overall level of efficiency. 
 
A simple model formalizing this analysis and showing in more detail the mechanisms at work 
is presented in the appendix. 
 
Based on these implications and the basic mechanisms described, we present in the next 
section our empirical examination of the relationship between aid and FDI. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the need of additional FDI flows. Our empirical results support this idea, and shows that the 
conditional correlation between savings and FDI is indeed negative. 
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Within the framework described in the Section 3, the relationship between aid and FDI should 
have the following reduced form structure: 
 
),,( XAK aidaidffdi  , (1) 
 
to reflect that the basic correlates of the level of FDI per capita in a country, fdi , are the 
amount of aid invested in physical capital per capita, Kaid ; the amount of aid to 
complementary factors, Aaid ; determinants of the level of physical capital in the country and 
other correlates of fdi  (all collected in X ), like the level of domestic savings per capita, S , 
the depreciation rate of the existing stock of k  (given by the physical rate of capital 
depreciation and the rate of population growth, n ), the rate of return to physical capital 
investments in a world with unrestricted capital mobility (which will be a given level for a 
small country), and some measure of initial economic conditions (like the initial overall 
productivity level in the economy, 0A ).
5
 
 
In a panel setting, the econometric interpretation of this aid-FDI relationship is 
 
  itAitAitKititititit uaidaidaidSnAfdi 
2
65432,010  , (2) 
 
where itfdi  is the net flow of FDI per capita to country i  during period t , itA ,0  is the overall 
productivity level at the beginning of period t , itn  is population growth, itS  is domestic 
savings per capita, Kitaid  is aid invested in physical capital, 
A
itaid  is aid invested in 
complementary factors, and 0  is a constant term capturing all time-invariant factors. The 
square of Aitaid  is included in the regression to reflect that total effect of Aaid  is conditional 
on its own level –feature that arises from the two counterbalancing first-order effects of 
complementary aid on FDI, namely that Aaid  increases the marginal productivity of capital 
and attracts additional foreign investments; but it also raises income, domestic savings and 
domestic investments, which lowers the MPK  and tends to crowd out foreign investments. 
The square of Kaid  is not included in the regression because, as explained in Section 3, 
                                                            
5 Equation (1) is basically a simplified representation of the reduced form derived for the steady state 
equilibrium in the theoretical model presented in the appendix (equation A.6). 
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without restrictions to capital mobility, aid directed to investments in physical capital 
substitutes fdi  independently of its own level, due to cross-country equalization of MPK . 
 
We expect 1  to be positive in this specification since higher productivity raises the steady 
state level of capital and the demand for FDI. We also expect 2  to be positive since a fast 
growing population dilutes the stock of k  and thus allows for an increase in FDI per capita. 
3  should be negative since a high level of domestic savings lowers the need for foreign 
capital. From the theoretical analysis, Kaid  is expected to crowd out foreign investments, and 
therefore the sign of 4  should be negative. If capital mobility is unrestricted (an assumption 
that we relax in Section 6), aid to physical capital should crowd out FDI one by one, and we 
should in fact expect 14  . Finally, as explained in Section 3, the net effect of Aaid  is 
theoretically indeterminate, so we do not have prior expectations for the signs of 5  and 6 . 
 
Interesting hypotheses that we can test with linear combinations of the estimated parameters 
are whether the effect of Kaid  is negative (and equal to 1 ), whether the effect of Aaid  is 
positive, and if the combined effect (or the effect of total aid) is significantly larger than zero. 
 
(a) Regression specification 
 
Precise data for the initial level of productivity ( itA ,0 ) are unavailable, so we need to find 
valid proxies for it before running regressions. We start by assuming that the initial level of 
productivity is the same for all countries, 0  and that it grows at a constant rate per period, so 
that titA   0,0 . If we make this assumption and pool the data, we can estimate 
 
  itAitAitKititittit uaidaidaidSnfdi 
2
654320  , (3) 
 
where t  is a time-specific constant (that captures common productivity shocks at time t ). 
 
However, not all countries start out with the same initial conditions, and therefore we allow 
also for cross sectional differences in productivity by including time-invariant country-
specific fixed effects, i : 
10 
 
 
  itAitAitKititititit uaidaidaidSnfdi 
2
654320  . (4) 
 
This equation can be consistently estimated with a fixed effects model (FE). But then again, if 
productivity evolves unequally across countries over time, regression (4) leaves out important 
information. We thus extend the list of regressors to include a lagged dependent variable, 
which captures time-moving country-specific factors and agglomeration effects, and basically 
reflects the persistent nature of FDI: 
 
  itAitAitKitititititit uaidaidaidSnfdifdi  
2
65432110  . (5) 
 
Equation (5) is a dynamic specification for panel data, which can be estimated consistently 
and efficiently using the Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators, and therefore 
constitutes our preferred econometric specification. To keep the empirical analysis as close as 
possible to our theoretical setup, the only additional control we add to this regression is the 
initial level of GDP per capita, 0iy , which is a strong proxy for time-varying initial conditions 
in each country. 
 
Summing up, in our empirical analysis we run regressions of the type 
 
  itAitAitKitititit uaidaidaidSnfdi  X
2
654320  , (6) 
 
where },,,{ 01 iitit yfdi  X . We do not add further controls here because we believe that 
the omitted variables bias is substantially reduced by including a full set of time dummies, 
individual country effects, the initial level of GDP per capita, and the lagged level of the 
dependent variable.
 6
 
                                                            
6 We can extend the set of controls X  by including a measure of human capital (for example the level 
of primary schooling), and a measure of climate and geographical characteristics (for example the 
amount of tropical land in the country), but these factors do not add significant value to the benchmark 
regression we want to establish at this stage, and do not affect our results either, so we maintain our 
basic specification without including them. Regressions showing the results including these variables 
11 
 
 
(b) Data 
 
The dependent variable in all our regressions, itfdi , is net FDI inflows in constant US dollars 
divided by population to control for country size. The FDI data is taken from UNCTAD's 
Foreign Direct Investment database.
7
 
 
The main control variables are the income per capita level, population growth rate and savings 
per capita, which are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
8
 
 
The aid variables are total net flows of official aid disbursements reported in the OECD aid 
statistics database. Since data on sectoral disbursements are available only after 1990, our 
measure of aid to a given sector is constructed using sectoral commitments as a proxy for 
sectoral disbursements.
9
 More precisely, we follow the approach in Clemens et al. (2011) and 
Thiele et al. (2006) and assume that the proportion of aid actually disbursed to sector x  
during a given period, xaid , is equal to the proportion of aid committed to sector x  during 
this period, and hence that 
 
xx
xx
x
x aid
commit
commit
aid 

 , (7) 
 
where xcommit  is the amount of ODA commitments to sector x , and xx commit  and 
xx aid  are the total amounts of aid commitments and disbursements received during each 
period, respectively. 
 
Approximating sectoral disbursements with sectoral commitments may cause some concerns 
due to differences in definitions and statistical record (see Clemens et al., 2011, for more 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
are available in the supplementary material for this paper, available at 
www.econ.ku.dk/pabloselaya/aidfdiWD2012/webappendix_april2012.pdf. 
7 The data can be accessed at www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=4979. 
8 Our data was extracted from the 2005 CD version. The data can also be accessed now at 
data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
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details). However, according to Odedokun (2003) and Clemens et al. (2011) this problem is 
likely to be small since disbursements and commitments (both on the aggregate and sectoral 
levels) are highly correlated. 
 
Aid is decomposed into two broad categories, relying on the sectoral disaggregation from 
OECD's Aid Activity database:
10
 
 Aid invested in complementary inputs, Aaid : aid oriented to social infrastructure (such as 
education, health, and water supply projects) and economic infrastructure (such as energy, 
transportation and communications projects). 
 Aid invested in physical capital, Kaid : contributions to directly productive sectors (such 
as agriculture, manufacturing, trade, banking and tourism projects). 
 
These two aid categories capture the main characteristics of Aaid  and Kaid : aid invested in 
complementary factors is intended to generate positive spillover effects (public goods, inputs 
complementary to physical capital) whereas aid invested in physical capital has a more 
narrow purpose and could more easily have been undertaken by private investors (projects of 
agriculture, forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade, banking and tourism). 
Other sectoral aid categories (like multisector support, program assistance, debt 
reorganization, emergency assistance and unallocated types of aid) are excluded from the 
analysis since they are primarily oriented to provide fiscal budget support in the recipient 
country.
11
 
 
Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix show statistics of Aaid  and Kaid  across time and 
countries. The statistics show that Kaid  has been on average 22% of total aid during the 
period 1970-2001, and Aaid  has been on average 50%. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
9 Data on total disbursements comes from OECD's DAC database, and data on sectoral aid 
commitments from OECD's Credit Reporting System database. Both datasets can be accessed at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm.  
10 OECD's sectoral classification for the purpose of aid is developed to facilitate tracking of aid flows 
and to permit measuring the share of each sector or other purpose category in total aid. For details on 
OECD's aid "purpose codes", and aid's disaggregation according to its purpose of investment, see 
www.oecd.org/dac/stats/crsguide.  
11 In Section 6 we present a number of robustness checks for our results, and address specifically their 
sensitivity to our definition of different types of aid.  
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All the data used in the estimations are averaged over five-year intervals to reduce the noise 
caused by sudden annual changes and possible discrepancies. 
 
(c) Endogeneity 
 
We need to consider the possible endogeneity of the aid variables (and all other variables in 
the right hand side) in our regressions, since the estimated coefficients are consistent only if 
all explanatory variables are exogenous. Aid would be endogenous if, for example, donors 
systematically disburse more resources to those countries that are neglected by private foreign 
investors (Harms and Lutz, 2006). 
 
We start by estimating regressions (3) and (4) with an instrumentation strategy that follows 
cross-country studies on aid effectiveness (e.g., Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 
2004), and use lags of the own aid variables, (log) GDP per capita levels and squared levels, 
(log) population levels, and a dummy for countries in the CFA franc zone. 
 
As shown in the tables below, these instruments are strong for the model estimated in levels 
(equation 3), but not for the model estimated including country fixed effects (equation 4), and 
they unfortunately do not pass standard tests of validity.
12
 We therefore opt for an 
identification strategy based on predetermined instruments, and take Arellano and Bond's 
(1991) first-difference GMM (GMM-DIFF) estimator, which relies on lagged levels as 
instruments for regressions in first differences, and later on Arellano and Bover(1995) and 
Blundell and Bond's (1998) system GMM (GMM-SYS) estimator, which supplements the 
GMM-DIFF set with a system of regressions in levels, with lagged first differences used as 
instruments. Validity of this instrumentation strategy can be assessed with tests of 
overidentification and autocorrelation of the residuals, which are described in the tables in the 
next section. 
 
                                                            
12 More precisely, column 1 in Table 1 shows that the first-stage F test for joint significance of the 
excluded instruments (Kleibergen-Paap statistic) is high and supports the hypothesis that the 
instruments are strong, but the Hansen test of overidentification rejects the hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid (uncorrelated with the error term and exogenous as a group). In column 2 we add 
country fixed effects, and the instruments gain marginally more validity, but lose completely their 
strength. In general, Roodman (2007) shows that the different instrumentation strategies in the 
traditional aid effectiveness literature are all fragile.  
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 1 reports the results of estimating equations (3) to (6) for a (non balanced) sample of 99 
countries for which we have disaggregated data, using data averaged over five-year intervals 
between 1970 and 2001. The standard errors reported are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity 
and intra-group correlation (clustering) within countries, and in columns 3 to 5 they also 
include the two-step correction for small samples suggested by Windmeijer (2005). 
 
– Table 1 here – 
 
Independently of the chosen estimator, our results strongly support the notions that aid to 
complementary factors has a positive effect on FDI, that aid invested in physical capital tends 
in turn to crowd out FDI, and that the net effect is small but always positive. 
 
In terms of specification, a Hausman test between columns 1 and 2 confirms the relevance of 
including fixed effects ( p -value 81.0 ). The lagged dependent variable is highly significant, 
which suggests that a dynamic model is a correct specification, and that we should then rely 
on consistent and efficient methods for estimating it, like Arellano and Bond's (1991) GMM-
DIFF. Results in column 3 report the results of estimating our preferred specification 
(equation 6) with this method. The coefficients have the same signs as in previous 
regressions, and the linear parameter tests show that we cannot reject the hypotheses that (a) 
Aaid  operates with scale effects, (b) 1Kaid , (c) 0Aaid  and (d) total 0aid , all of 
them supporting the main predictions of our theoretical analysis. 
 
The Hansen test of overidentification does not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments 
as a group appear as exogenous. The tests of autocorrelation cannot reject the absence of 
autocorrelation in the second, third and fourth differences (they cannot reject absence of 
AR(1) in column 3 either, but only marginally). This indicates that second and higher-order 
lags of the endogenous variables are valid instruments. Based on this, we limit the number of 
included lags to only the second, which helps us to conform to the "rule of thumb" of keeping 
the number of instruments below the number of cross sections (Roodman, 2006), and control 
15 
 
the problem of overfitting the Hansen test of instruments joint validity that appears when the 
number of instruments approaches the number of observations (Roodman, 2009).
13
 
 
Based on the indication that there might be AR(1) and that persistence in the FDI variable is 
important, we turn to GMM-SYS estimators. Column 4 presents the result of estimating 
equation (5), and column 5 presents the results of estimating equation (6), which is the richest 
(and our preferred) econometric specification. 
 
Column 5 in Table 1 shows that one dollar of aid invested on physical capital crowds out on 
average 0.84 dollars of FDI in per capita terms. The table also shows that one aid dollar 
invested in complementary factors attracts on average 1.09 dollars of additional FDI. This 
type of aid works with scale effects, so, evaluated at the median (21.6 dollars per capita), our 
results indicate that one dollar of aid invested in complementary factors draws in total 1.03 
( 6.210013.0209.1  ) dollars of FDI in per capita terms. The corresponding Wald test 
confirms this marginal effect to be significantly positive at the 1% level. 
 
Having specified a dynamic model we can calculate long-run effects of Kaid  and Aaid , by 
assuming that the level of FDI per capita is the same in every period. Evaluated at the median, 
we find that one additional aid dollar per capita invested in complementary factors draws in 
1.98 dollars of FDI per capita in the long run (
48.01
03.1

) – which indicates that Aaid  generates 
important benefits for foreign investors both in the short and the long run. 
 
The results also confirm the crowding out effect of aid invested in physical capital, which in 
the short run costs about 0.84 dollars of FDI per capita for each dollar of aid invested in 
physical capital, and that accumulates to a level of 1.61 dollars in the long run. Interestingly, 
the Wald tests reported at the bottom of the table show that the negative effect of Kaid  on 
fdi  is statistically not different from 1 , which supports Caselli and Feyrer's (2007) estimate 
that the MPK  tends to be equalized across countries. 
 
                                                            
13 This choice helps us to observe the minimally arbitrary "rule of thumb" proposed by Roodman 
(2006) of keeping the number of instruments below the number of cross sections to make the 
regressions less susceptible to the problem of "too many instruments" (Roodman, 2009). 
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The effect of other controls is either insignificant or goes according to the theoretical 
predictions: population growth enters insignificantly, domestic savings negatively (1 
additional dollar of domestic savings per capita is associated with 17 dollars less of FDI per 
capita on average), and initial GDP per capita enters positively (1 additional dollar of GDP 
per capita at the beginning of each period tends to attract 8.72 dollars of FDI per capita on 
average). 
 
A Wald test also show that the combined effect of Aaid  and Kaid  is significantly positive and 
equal to 0.19 dollars (evaluated at the median), which implies that the substitution effect of 
Kaid  is more than outweighed by the positive effects of Aaid  on fdi  in a typical case.
14
 
 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
In light of the policy implications arising from the analysis, it is necessary to ensure that the 
results are robust to correcting for possible misspecifications. We carry out three basic checks 
for robustness of our empirical findings. 
 
(a) Technical assistance 
 
The grouping of our sectoral aid variables could be questioned. In particular, aid to 
complementary factors in this paper does not include Technical Cooperation Grants (TCGs), 
which aim to contribute to development primarily through education and training. Since 
TCGs consist of activities involving the supply of human resources or actions targeted on 
human resources (education, training, and advice) one could easily argue that TCGs would 
have the same impact as aid invested in complementary factors.
15
 In Table 2 below we 
therefore replicate the specifications from Table 1 using an extended definition of Aaid  that 
includes also TCGs from the OECD database. 
 
– Table 2 here – 
 
                                                            
14 If the marginal effects are evaluated at the mean instead of the median, our conclusions remain the 
same. 
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Although there is a slight drop in the size of the main coefficients, the results from Table 1 
carry completely over. 
 
(b) Imperfect capital mobility 
 
In our theoretical analysis we assume unrestricted capital mobility and, therefore, MPK  
equalization across countries. If this is assumption unrealistic, we should allow in our 
theoretical analysis the return to capital investments to reflect idiosyncratic risk characteristics 
in each country. 
 
Assuming each country has a given level of idiosyncratic risk,  , the capital stock in each 
country will conform then to a different risk-adjusted level of MPK . From there, the 
relationship between Kaid  and FDI will essentially continue as before: for given levels of 
initial domestic savings and idiosyncratic risks, an increase in Kaid  will tend to decrease the 
overall MPK  and thereby crowd out fdi . This means that in our preferred econometric 
specification (6) we will have to add some measure of   to still be able to identify the effect 
of Kaid . 
 
Including a measure of   in our regressions  is necessary then to account for the effect of 
imperfect capital mobility on Kaid , but not sufficient, since it affects also Aaid :   
determines basically a new level for the stock of capital in the economy ( k ), but this capital 
stock is also determined by the level of complementary factors in the economy ( A ), which is 
directly affected by Aaid . The interplay between   and Aaid  has first order effects, and we 
therefore need to reflect this explicitly in the regression. (The model in the appendix shows 
formally the effects of allowing for imperfect capital mobility across countries and 
introducing country specific risks into consideration). 
 
Based on this, our regression specification should now look like 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
15 TCGs were not initially included in the definition of Aaid  , since they can in theory also contribute 
to an aid project in some productive sector of the economy. 
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    ititAititAitAitKitititit uaidaidaidaidSnfdi  X 76
2
543210 , (8) 
 
where it  is a measure of idiosyncratic risk that might affect investment decisions. The signs 
of 6  and 7  are expected to be negative or positive, depending on it  increasing or 
reducing country i  's attractiveness as an investment location. 
 
We use the overall International Country Risk Guide rating and its 12 specific political risk 
components as different measures of it .
16
  
 
In general, lower political risk is associated with higher levels of overall accountability, 
stability and institutional quality in the political process. In particular, from the specific ICRG 
rankings, political risk is lower the higher the government stability, the better the 
socioeconomic conditions and the investment profile, the lower the number of internal 
conflicts, external conflicts and political corruption, the lower the military is involved in 
politics, the lower the religious and the ethnic tensions, the higher the prevalence of law and 
order, and the larger the degrees of democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality. 
 
– Table 3 here – 
 
Results from estimating regression (8) including these political risk measures are reported in 
Table 3.
17
 We treat all risk variables as endogenous, and find that none of the political risk 
indices enter the regression significantly by themselves, but that some of them affect 
significantly through Aaid : a better ranking in the overall ICRG country risk indicator, 
government stability, better socioeconomic conditions, better investment profile, and higher 
bureaucratic quality. Although the results also show that the conditional effect of some of the 
indexes reduce significance of the effects of Kaid  and Aaid , the marginal effect of aid on FDI 
remains positive and significant in practically all cases considered, and our most important 
                                                            
16 In order to detect significant effects of aid on FDI, Karakaplan et al. (2005) and Harms and Lutz 
(2006) use aid interacted with the Kaufmann et al. (2005) governance indicators to capture differences 
in government effectiveness. 
17 For results in Table 3, a high value of the different political-risk measures is associated with a low 
overall political risk, and hence, a high value of the different risk measures should have a positive 
effect on fdi . 
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findings appear more robustly: Kaid  affects negatively fdi  and we cannot reject that the 
effect is statistically equal to –1, Aaid  affects positively and the impact is positive, and the 
marginal net effect is typically small but statistically positive and significant.
 18
 These results 
are reassuring, since we are now controlling for the facts that mobility across countries is 
probably neither perfect nor unrestricted, and that political risks are likely to be an important 
direct determinant of FDI allocation. 
 
(c) Omitted variables 
 
In general, our specification should also be guided by the extensive literature on FDI 
determinants. Blonigen and Piger (2011) present the most updated and comprehensive survey 
on this topic. They use statistical techniques to identify from a large set of candidates those 
variables that are most likely to be determinants of FDI. They find that traditional gravity 
variables (real GDP levels and distance between countries), cultural factors, relative labor 
endowments, and regional trade agreements are the variables with higher inclusion 
probabilities in an empirical FDI regression. Blonigen and Piger (2011) also report variables 
thought to be important determinants, but which according to their calculations have low 
inclusion probabilities and appear as non-robust in more comprehensive tests: multilateral 
trade openness, business costs, infrastructure (including credit markets), and institutions. 
 
We estimated equation (8) including proxies for all these categories, using growth rates of real 
GDP per capita; variables for socioeconomic, religious and ethnic conditions, geographic and 
climate characteristics, and a number of variables that proxy for the quality of political 
institutions. Our results remain remarkably stable and are similar to the ones reported in Table 
3. (These results are reported in the supplementary material for this paper, available in a web 
appendix.)
19
 
 
We believe that the omitted variables bias is substantially reduced by controlling for country 
fixed effects, time dummies, a lagged dependent variable and other controls, and that we do a 
                                                            
18 The only exception occurs with the number of external conflicts, where the positive effect of Aaid  
and the negative effect of Kaid  are strongly significant and very close in magnitude, so that the 
combined effect remains positive but significant only at the 21% level. 
19 Available at www.econ.ku.dk/pabloselaya/aidfdiWD2012/webappendix_april2012.pdf. 
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fair assessment of misspecification by checking the effect of other potential determinants of 
FDI and confounders in Table 3. However, one final check we could present is for the 
existence of regional effects – to control, for example, for the possibility that aid is more 
effective in attracting FDI in some continents and not in others. 
 
In Table 4 we add a full set of continent dummies to our basic specification (regression 6), 
and test our results with the benchmark definition of Aaid , and the alternative definition of it 
including TCGs.
 20
  
 
– Table 4 here – 
 
Columns 1 and 3 in Table 4 reproduce our becnhamrk regressions (shown in column 5 in 
Tables 1 and 2 repectively), to facilitate comparison. Columns 2 and 4 in Table 4 show that 
inclusion of regional effects in our main regressions does not change the results. These 
columns also show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the set of continent dummies are 
jointly statistically insignificant, which is an indication that aid is not more effective in 
attracting FDI in certain continents and not in others. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Due to its potential to transfer knowledge and technology, create jobs, boost overall 
productivity, and enhance competitiveness and entrepreneurship, attracting FDI to developing 
countries is essential to contribute to economic growth, development and poverty reduction.
21
 
Given the emphasis on using ODA as a vehicle for creating a private sector enabling 
environment, the question of whether or not aid flows induce significantly more FDI inflows 
becomes an important and relevant question not only on its own right but also as an essential 
element in the aid effectiveness debate. 
 
                                                            
20 The inclusion of regional dummies makes a difference in a dynamic panel regression, because we 
estimate our main regressions with GMM-SYS, where country-specific and time-invariant regressors 
affect the part of the system estimated in levels. 
21 An effective contribution of FDI to growth and development also depends on other factors, among 
them its contribution to environmental and social development in the host countries, and its support to 
their national development priorities. See Te Welde (2006) for a historical perspective on FDI and 
development, and Alfaro et al. (2010) for an assessment of FDI's impact on growth. 
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Our results strongly support the hypotheses that aid invested in inputs complementary to 
physical capital draws in foreign capital, while aid directly invested in physical capital crowds 
out private foreign investments. While the impact of the two types of aid together is positive, 
an important policy implication is that the composition of foreign aid matters for its overall 
level of efficiency. This is particularly important for debates where the discussion tends to 
center on the amount of aid to be donated to poorest countries. 
 
Our analysis supports the recommendation of investing aid in complementary inputs. Such 
investments improve absorption capacity and increase MPK  in the host countries, which 
allows them to accumulate more foreign capital without experiencing a drop in domestic 
private investments or a flight of foreign capital.■ 
22 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Acemoglu, D. (2010). Theory, General Equilibrium, and Political Economy in Development 
Economics. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(3), 17-32. 
Alfaro, L., S. Kalemli-Ozcan, A. Chanda, and S. Sayek (2010). Does Foreign Direct 
Investment Promote Growth? Exploring the Role of Financial Markets on Linkages. 
Journal of Development Economics, 91(2), 242-56. 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data, Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58, 
277-97. 
Arellano, M. and O. Bover (1995). Another look at the Instrumental Variables estimation of 
Error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68, 29-51. 
Beladi H. and R. Oladi (2007). Does foreign aid impede foreign investment?, Ch. 4 in S. 
Lahiri (ed.), Theory and practice of Foreign Aid. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier. 
Bhavan, T. C. Xu and C. Zhong (2011). The Relationship between Foreign Aid and FDI in 
South Asian Economies. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 3(2), 143-49. 
Blaise, S. (2005). On the link between Japanese ODA and FDI in China: A microeconomic 
evaluation using Conditional Logit analysis. Applied Economics, 37, 51-55. 
Blonigen, B. and J. Piger (2011). Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment. NBER Working 
Paper No. 16704. 
Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998). Initial conditions and moments restrictions in Dynamic 
Panel Data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-43. 
Carro, M. and J. Larrú (2010). Flowing Together or Flowing Apart: An Analysis of the 
Relation between FDI and ODA Flows to Argentina and Brazil. MPRA Paper No. 25064. 
Caselli, F. and J. Feyrer (2007). The marginal product of capital. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 122(2), 535-68. 
Chatterjee, S., G. Sakoulis and S. J. Turnovsky (2003). Unilateral capital transfers, public 
investment and economic growth. European Economic Review, 47, 1077-1103. 
Clarida, R. H. (1993). International capital mobility, public investment and economic growth. 
NBER Working Paper 4506. 
Clemens, M., S. Radelet, R. Bhavnani and S. Bazzi (2011). Counting chickens when they 
hatch: The short-term effect of aid on growth. Economic Journal, forthcoming. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02482.x. 
23 
 
Dalgaard, C., H. Hansen and F. Tarp (2004). On the empirics of foreign aid and growth. 
Economic Journal, 114, 191-216. 
Easterly, W. and R. Levine (1997). Africa's growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1203-50. 
Hansen, H. and Tarp, F. (2001). Aid and growth regressions. Journal of Development 
Economics, 64(2), 547-70. 
Harms, P. and M. Lutz (2006). Aid, governance and private foreign investment: Some 
puzzling findings for the 1990s. Economic Journal, 116, 773-90. 
Karakaplan, M. U., B. Neyapti and S. Sayek (2005). Aid and foreign investment: International 
evidence, Departmental Working Paper, Bilkent University. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2005). Governance matters IV: Governance 
indicators for 1996-2004, The World Bank. 
Kimura, H. and Y. Todo (2010). Is foreign aid a vanguard of FDI? A gravity equation 
approach. World Development, 38(4), 482-97. 
Kosack S. and J. Tobin (2006). Funding self-sustaining development: The role of aid, FDI and 
government in economic success. International Organization, 60, 205-43. 
Loayza, N., K. Schmidt-Hebbel and L. Servén (2000). What drives private saving across the 
world?. Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(2), 165-81. 
Roodman, D. (2009). A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 71(1), 135-58. 
Roodman, D. (2007). The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development, and Cross-Country 
Empirics. World Bank Economic Review, 21(2), 255-77. 
Roodman, D. (2006). How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to "Difference" and "System" 
GMM in Stata. CGDEV Working Paper 103. 
Odedokun, M. (2003). Analysis of deviations and delays in aid disbursements. Journal of 
Economic Development, 137(28), 137-69. 
OECD (2004). OECD glossary of statistical terms, Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development. 
Reinikka, R. and J. Svensson (2002). Coping with poor public capital. Journal of 
Development Economics, 69, 51-69. 
Sørensen, P. B. and H. J. Whitta-Jacobsen (2005), Wealth accumulation and capital mobility: 
The Solow model for a small open economy. Ch. 4 in Sørensen, P. B. and H. J. Whitta-
Jacobsen (2005), Introducing advanced macroeconomics: Growth and business cycles. 
Berkshire, UK: MacGraw-Hill. 
24 
 
Te Welde, D. W. (2006). Foreign Direct Investment and Development: An historical 
perspective. Background paper for the UN 2006 World Economic and Social Survey. ODI, 
available at www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/850.pdf.  
Thiele, R., P. Nunnenkamp and A. Dreher (2006). Sectoral aid priorities: Are donors really 
doing their best to achieve the Millennium Development Goals?, Kiel Institute for World 
Economics Working Paper No. 1266. 
Turnovsky, S. J. (2000). Growth in an open economy: Some recent developments, National 
Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 5. 
United Nations (2002). Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, 
signed in Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March 2002. 
Windmeijer, F. (2005). A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step 
GMM estimators. Journal of Econometrics, 126, 25-51. 
25 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 1. Foreign aid and FDI 
 
      
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 2SLS 2SLS+FE GMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-SYS 
      
      
aidK -0.85 -1.36*** -0.62 -0.84** -0.84*** 
 
[0.65] [0.22] [0.46] [0.33] [0.29] 
aidA 1.74*** 1.67*** 1.33*** 1.13*** 1.09*** 
 
[0.44] [0.22] [0.32] [0.38] [0.32] 
aidA, squared -0.0027*** -0.0013** -0.0015*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
 
[0.00069] [0.00063] [0.00023] [0.00037] [0.00031] 
savings per cap., S 13.9 53.1* 53.9*** -0.47 -17.0** 
 
[11.6] [30.6] [11.1] [7.85] [7.30] 
pop. growth, n -8.97** -1.58 4.59 -7.00 -2.39 
 
[4.19] [1.89] [30.3] [6.99] [5.93] 
fdi, lagged 
  
0.074 0.48*** 0.48*** 
   
[0.20] [0.12] [0.11] 
GDP per capita, y 
    
8.72*** 
     
[2.99] 
      
      
Observations 325 307 239 325 325 
N countries (clusters) 99 81 85 99 99 
N excluded instruments 6 5 24 54 64 
1st stage F, Kleibergen-Paap 21.1 0.49 
   
Hansen overid., p-value 0.021 0.15 0.5 0.14 0.21 
AR(1), p-value 
  
0.12 0.012 0.013 
AR(2), p-value 
  
0.30 0.33 0.25 
AR(3), p-value 
  
0.52 0.26 0.24 
AR(4), p-value 
  
0.39 0.27 0.25 
      
      
H0: aidK = -1 0.15 -0.36 0.38 0.16 0.16 
 
[0.65] [0.22] [0.46] [0.33] [0.29] 
H0: aid > 0 0.77 0.25 0.65 0.22 0.19 
 
[0.55]* [0.31] [0.41]* [0.087]*** [0.058]*** 
H0: aidA > 0 1.62 1.61 1.26 1.07 1.03 
 
[0.42]*** [0.2]*** [0.31]*** [0.37]*** [0.31]*** 
      
Notes. The dependent variable is FDI per capita (fdi). All regressions include time dummies and a 
constant term. Aid variables are instrumented with own lags, (log) levels and square levels of GDP per 
capita, (log) population, and a FRZ dummy in columns 1 and 2. We use predetermined instruments in 
columns 3–5 (second lags in column 3; and second lags and lagged differences in columns 4 and 5). 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the country level, and including Windmeijer’s (2005) 
small sample correction in columns 3–5. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels. 
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Table 2. Foreign aid and FDI — Alternative definition of aidA 
 
      
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 2SLS 2SLS+FE GMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-SYS 
      
      
aidK -0.49 -1.40*** -0.68* -0.69* -0.74** 
 
[0.73] [0.27] [0.41] [0.35] [0.30] 
aidA* 0.99*** 1.72*** 1.44*** 0.92** 0.94*** 
 
[0.31] [0.16] [0.35] [0.38] [0.32] 
aidA*, squared -0.0017*** -0.0013** -0.0016*** -0.0011*** -0.0012*** 
 
[0.00056] [0.00059] [0.00028] [0.00036] [0.00031] 
savings per cap., S 20.6 45.5* 47.4*** -0.44 -23.1*** 
 
[13.7] [27.0] [10.6] [9.83] [6.69] 
pop. growth, n -11.5** -2.52 -0.50 -14.0* -6.75 
 
[4.92] [2.13] [24.4] [8.36] [6.23] 
fdi, lagged 
  
0.09 0.46*** 0.46*** 
   
[0.20] [0.14] [0.13] 
GDP per capita, y 
    
12.1*** 
     
[3.25] 
      
      
Observations 323 307 237 323 323 
N countries (clusters) 97 81 83 97 97 
N excluded instruments 6 5 24 54 64 
1st stage F, Kleibergen-Paap 71 0.44 
   
Hansen overid., p-value 0.015 0.073 0.47 0.21 0.17 
AR(1), p-value 
  
0.11 0.0095 0.012 
AR(2), p-value 
  
0.35 0.44 0.28 
AR(3), p-value 
  
0.42 0.20 0.17 
AR(4), p-value 
  
0.40 0.23 0.20 
      
      
H0: aidK = -1 0.51 -0.4 0.32 0.31 0.26 
 
[0.73] [0.27] [0.41] [0.35] [0.3] 
H0: aid > 0 0.42 0.26 0.68 0.18 0.15 
 
[0.62] [0.33] [0.34]** [0.1]** [0.061]*** 
H0: aidA > 0 0.92 1.66 1.37 0.87 0.89 
 
[0.3]*** [0.15]*** [0.34]*** [0.36]*** [0.3]*** 
      
Notes. The dependent variable is FDI per capita (fdi). aidA* is defined as aidA + technical cooperation 
grants. All regressions include time dummies and a constant term. Aid variables are instrumented with 
own lags, (log) levels and square levels of GDP per capita, (log) population, and a FRZ dummy in 
columns 1 and 2. We use predetermined instruments in columns 3–5 (second lags in column 3; and 
second lags and lagged differences in columns 4 and 5). Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered 
at the country level, and including Windmeijer’s (2005) small sample correction in columns 3–5. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels. 
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Table 3. Foreign aid and FDI — Political risks 
 
        
  Political risk 
        
        
Risk measure: ICRG 
index 
Govt. 
stability 
Socio-ec. 
condit. 
Investm. 
profile 
Internal 
conflict 
External 
conflict 
Political 
corrupt. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
        
aidK -0.55 -0.52 -0.73*** -0.59** -0.87*** -0.90*** -0.78** 
 
[0.36] [0.43] [0.25] [0.29] [0.27] [0.30] [0.30] 
aidA -0.32 0.19 0.34 0.16 1.15*** 1.24*** 0.44 
 
[0.80] [0.72] [0.38] [0.53] [0.25] [0.40] [0.65] 
aidA, squared -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0011*** 
 
[0.00030] [0.00032] [0.00029] [0.00025] [0.00035] [0.00031] [0.00037] 
Risk  0.21 0.54 0.29 -0.99 0.18 2.5 0.063 
 
[0.66] [6.12] [3.18] [3.44] [3.20] [2.69] [7.48] 
aidA × Risk 0.021** 0.11** 0.12*** 0.12*** -0.008 -0.017 0.23 
 
[0.0094] [0.050] [0.027] [0.036] [0.025] [0.026] [0.16] 
savings p.c., S -32.7*** -21.5*** -23.9*** -22.5*** -22.5*** -22.5*** -15.2 
 
[8.78] [6.13] [6.98] [6.88] [6.04] [8.39] [14.5] 
pop. growth, n -5 -6.88 -14.9** -8.77 -10.1* -11.2** -14.6** 
 
[4.68] [5.30] [5.82] [5.28] [5.81] [5.57] [7.06] 
fdi, lagged 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.38*** 
 
[0.10] [0.096] [0.11] [0.097] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] 
GDP per cap., y 10.9*** 9.01** 11.4*** 10.6*** 11.0*** 11.2*** 10.3** 
 
[3.62] [3.67] [3.53] [3.54] [3.72] [3.54] [5.05] 
        
        
Observations 264 262 262 262 262 262 262 
N countries 
(clusters) 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 
N excluded 
instruments 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
AR(1), p-value 0.018 0.03 0.014 0.017 0.012 0.012 0.011 
AR(2), p-value 0.17 0.098 0.089 0.13 0.067 0.077 0.069 
AR(3), p-value 0.22 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.15 0.1 
Hansen overid., 
p-value 0.5 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.46 0.23 0.42 
        
        
H0: aidK = -1 0.45 0.48 0.27 0.41 0.13 0.10 0.22 
 
[0.36] [0.43] [0.25] [0.29] [0.27] [0.30] [0.3] 
H0: aid > 0 0.32 0.45 0.14 0.21 0.16 0.12 0.28 
 
[0.071]*** [0.12]*** [0.068]** [0.046]*** [0.076]** [0.098] [0.09]*** 
H0: aidA > 0 0.87 0.97 0.87 0.80 1.03 1.02 1.07 
 
[0.34]*** [0.33]*** [0.3]*** [0.31]*** [0.31]*** [0.32]*** [0.3]*** 
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Table 3 (continued). Foreign aid and FDI — Political risks 
 
       
 
Political risk 
       
       
Risk measure: Military in 
politics 
Religious 
tensions 
Law and 
order 
Ethnic 
tensions 
Democratic 
accountab. 
Bureauc. 
quality 
 
8 9 10 11 12 13 
       
       
aidK -0.41 -0.86*** -0.83** -0.85*** -0.73** -0.71** 
 
[0.47] [0.28] [0.35] [0.29] [0.30] [0.33] 
aidA 0.34 1.35*** 0.96* 1.22*** 0.87** 0.86** 
 
[0.69] [0.33] [0.50] [0.41] [0.37] [0.40] 
aidA, squared -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
-
0.0013*** 
-0.0013*** -0.0014*** -0.0013*** 
 
[0.00033] [0.00033] [0.00031] [0.00032] [0.00028] [0.00033] 
Risk -1.94 2.16 -7.99 -2.59 1.19 -8.68 
 
[4.70] [4.67] [5.37] [5.20] [6.42] [5.69] 
aidA x Risk 0.17** -0.066*** 0.047 -0.036 0.052 0.10*** 
 
[0.082] [0.015] [0.080] [0.049] [0.053] [0.037] 
savings p.c., S -33.7*** -20.1*** -24.4*** -24.3*** -24.4*** -24.0*** 
 
[9.43] [6.41] [7.71] [6.85] [6.80] [7.02] 
pop. growth, n -7.27 -12.4* -7.66 -13.8** -7.58 -12.2* 
 
[5.87] [6.71] [5.30] [6.04] [5.12] [6.70] 
fdi, lagged 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.47*** 0.44*** 
 
[0.090] [0.11] [0.10] [0.11] [0.12] [0.10] 
GDP per cap., y 11.5*** 11.6*** 12.9*** 13.5*** 10.3*** 11.9*** 
 
[3.56] [2.73] [4.19] [4.24] [3.45] [3.29] 
       
       
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 262 
N countries 
(clusters) 82 82 82 82 82 82 
N excluded 
instruments 71 71 71 71 71 71 
AR(1), p-value 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.015 
AR(2), p-value 0.092 0.064 0.08 0.082 0.10 0.10 
AR(3), p-value 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.15 
Hansen overid., 
p-value 0.35 0.24 0.43 0.36 0.37 0.39 
       
       
H0: aidK = -1 0.59 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.27 0.29 
 
[0.47] [0.28] [0.35] [0.29] [0.3] [0.33] 
H0: aid > 0 0.37 0.1 0.21 0.18 0.25 0.29 
 
[0.079]*** [0.077]* [0.084]*** [0.068]*** [0.064]*** [0.083]*** 
H0: aidA > 0 0.78 0.96 1.04 1.02 0.98 1.00 
 
[0.44]** [0.34]*** [0.31]*** [0.32]*** [0.29]*** [0.34]*** 
       
Notes. The dependent variable is FDI per capita (fdi). Risk measures taken from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). All regressions are estimated by GMM-SYS, and include a full set of 
time dummies and a constant term. Aid variables are instrumented with their second lags and lagged 
differences. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the country level, and including 
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Windmeijer’s (2005) small sample correction.***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% 
levels.  
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Table 4. Foreign aid and FDI — Regional effects 
 
      
 benchmark definition of aidA  alternative def. of aidA (aidA*) 
      
      
 GMM-SYS GMM-SYS  GMM-SYS GMM-SYS 
 1 2  3 4 
      
      
aidK -0.84*** -0.89***  -0.74** -0.80*** 
 [0.29] [0.28]  [0.30] [0.29] 
aidA (aidA*) 1.09*** 1.10***  0.94*** 0.97*** 
 [0.32] [0.28]  [0.32] [0.28] 
aidA (aidA*), squared -0.0013*** -0.0013***  -0.0012*** -0.0012*** 
 [0.00031] [0.00026]  [0.00031] [0.00027] 
savings per cap., S -17.0** -2.53  -23.1*** -6.39 
 [7.30] [12.0]  [6.69] [11.5] 
pop. growth, n -2.39 5.1  -6.75 1.73 
 [5.93] [7.61]  [6.23] [7.41] 
fdi, lagged 0.48*** 0.46***  0.46*** 0.43*** 
 [0.11] [0.094]  [0.13] [0.11] 
GDP per capita, y 8.72*** 1.21  12.1*** 3.43 
 [2.99] [6.43]  [3.25] [6.08] 
      
      
Observations 325 324  323 322 
N countries (clusters) 99 98  97 96 
N instruments 64 59  64 59 
Hansen overid., p-value 0.21 0.29  0.17 0.19 
AR(1), p-value 0.013 0.011  0.012 0.011 
AR(2), p-value 0.25 0.48  0.28 0.66 
AR(3), p-value 0.24 0.25  0.17 0.18 
AR(4), p-value 0.25 0.26  0.20 0.23 
Continent dummies No Yes  No Yes 
H0: cont. dumm. = 0 (p-value) - 0.59  - 0.55 
      
      
H0: aidK = -1 0.16 0.11  0.26 0.20 
 [0.29] [0.28]  [0.30] [0.29] 
H0: aid > 0 0.19 0.15  0.15 0.12 
 [0.058]*** [0.086]**  [0.061]*** [0.09]* 
H0: aidA > 0 1.03 1.04  0.89 0.92 
 [0.31]*** [0.27]***  [0.30]*** [0.27]*** 
      
Notes. The dependent variable is FDI per capita (fdi). aidA* is defined as aidA + technical cooperation 
grants. All regressions are estimated by GMM-SYS, and include a full set of time dummies and a 
constant term. Aid variables are instrumented with their second lags and lagged differences. Robust 
standard errors in brackets, clustered at the country level, and including Windmeijer’s (2005) small 
sample correction.***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
A theoretical model of aid and FDI 
 
This section presents a Solow model for a small open economy, adapted to studying the 
relationship between different types of aid flows and FDI. 
 
Assume a Cobb-Douglas production function where GDP per capita, y , is given by 
 
Aky  , (A.1) 
 
where k  is the stock of physical capital per capita (
L
K ), A  denotes total factor productivity, 
and   is a constant. 
 
Assume that the total flow of foreign aid, AID , can be split into aid invested in 
complementary factors, AAID , and aid invested in physical capital, KAID , so that 
KA AIDAIDAID  . The part invested in complementary factors, AAID , raises the marginal 
productivity of all production factors that are complementary to physical capital.
22
 Aid to 
complementary factors helps for example to finance infrastructure investments that lead to the 
interconnection of markets (Easterly and Levine, 1999), or investments in human capital 
improve technology adoption. On the other hand, aid invested in physical capital, KAID , 
enters the production function only through its effect on physical capital accumulation and has 
no (augmenting) effect on total factor productivity. 
 
To model the augmenting effect of complementary aid on all production factors that are 
complementary to physical capital, we allow the flow of AAID  to increase the existing stock 
of A  ( 0A ) in the economy: 
 
AAIDAA  0 . (A.2) 
 
Allowing complementary aid to have a direct impact on A  is a shorthand for the idea that 
AAID  has an augmenting effect on any production factor other than k  (e.g. human capital, 
public investments, new technology, etc.) and, thus, it is ultimately able to increase the 
MPK .
23
 
                                                            
22 The argument of complementarity between public and private investment is generalized by Clarida 
(1993) and Chatterjee et al. (2003). Reinikka and Svensson (2002) find empirical support for the 
importance of complementary public capital for foreign investors. 
23 We could assume that FDI (and domestic savings) also contributes to the accumulation of TFP in 
the economy. Our assumption that only one part of aid contributes to increasing TFP highlights the 
fact that there is one part of aid that explicitly aims to transfer technology, improve institutions, etc., 
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We assume an open economy.
24
 Accordingly, capital equipment (in per capita terms) is 
financed by ( i ) domestic savings ( syS  , where s  is a given savings rate), and also by ( ii ) 
foreign direct investments ( fdi ) and ( iii ) the part of aid invested in physical capital ( Kaid ). 
Then, capital accumulation in per capita terms is given by 
 
knaidfdisyk K )( 
 , (A.3) 
 
where n  is the population growth rate and   is a fixed depreciation rate. 
 
With perfect capital mobility (following Caselli and Feyrer, 2007), the world real rate of 
return, wr , pins down at any point in time the net return to capital ( MPK ), and thus 
 
   1kAMPKr w . (A.4) 
 
According to (A.4), the steady state level of k  at any point in time is given by 
 
 







1
1
r
A
k , (A.5) 
 
where r  is defined as a gross world real rate of return, wr . 
 
Rewriting (A.3) taking (A.5) as given, the flow of FDI per capita is determined as the residual 
 
  knsyaidfdi K )(  , (A.6) 
 
where   Aky . 
 
At a first glance, (A.6) seems to support the Caselli and Feyrer (2007) conjecture that aid and 
FDI are substitutes: for a given level of domestic savings, equalization between MPK  and r  
requires an increase in foreign aid to be accommodated by a proportional reduction in FDI: 
 
1


Kaid
fdi
. (A.7) 
 
However, this type of relationship only holds for aid invested in physical capital. The effect of 
complementary aid has two components: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
whereas the effects that FDI (and domestic savings) have on TFP might be important as well but in 
practice are only indirect. 
24 In line with Sørensen and Witta-Jacobsen (2005, Ch. 4) and Turnovsky (2000). 
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First, since 
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, (A.9) 
 
we see that complementary aid has a positive effect on the steady state capital stock. This 
finding is based on the augmenting effect of Aaid  on TFP ( A ), which rises the MPK  and 
allows the recipient country to increase its capital stock without experiencing a 
counterbalancing capital flight. More precisely, for a given level of s , aid-financed 
investments in complementary factors allow a sustainable increase in FDI equal to 
Aaid
kn 
  )(  . 
 
Second, since 
 
 
01 












 

AAA aid
k
kALks
aid
Ak
s
aid
y
s 

 , (A.10) 
 
complementary aid has a positive effect on domestic savings and thus on domestically 
financed capital investments. This comes from the fact that Aaid  shifts the production 
function and thereby raises the steady state levels of income and domestic savings. Given the 
assumption of MPK  equalization in (A.4), the corresponding increase in domestically 
financed investments causes a proportional reduction of size 
Aaid
ys 
   in the need for FDI. 
 
This model holds several implications that should be taken into account when assessing the 
empirical relationship between aid and FDI. First, the effect of total aid on FDI is ambiguous: 
 
AAAK aid
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
 
)(1  ≷0, (A.11) 
 
because we expect aid to production sectors to have a negative effect on FDI, but the effect of 
complementary aid is indeterminate. Second, from equations (second component) and 
(savings effect), since the marginal effect of complementary aid on FDI includes the level of 
complementary aid itself, the relationship between complementary aid and FDI is not linear, 
and there are scale effects from complementary aid that should be taken into account.
25
 Since 
                                                            
25 The main reason for expecting significant scale effects only for Aaid  is that it has two first-order 
effects on the level of FDI: it increases the marginal productivity and attracts additional foreign 
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Aaid
ys 
   and 
Aaid
kn 
  )(   work in opposite directions, the sign of the second order effects will 
also be indeterminate and will need to be assessed empirically. Third, the model stresses the 
need to take all sources of capital into account, and it is therefore essential to include domestic 
savings as an additional explanatory variable in any empirical analysis of FDI. To our 
knowledge, this has not been done before. 
 
Imperfect capital mobility 
 
If mobility of capital is imperfect, MPK  should be allowed to deviate from the gross world 
interest rate by a risk-premium,  , that reflects idiosyncratic country characteristics. In this 
case, the first-order condition in (A.4) should read 
 
MPKr   , (A.12) 
 
and the capital stock in (A.5) should be redefined accordingly: 
 

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k . (A.13) 
 
While this renders the effect of aid invested in physical capital unchanged, the effect of 
complementary aid becomes somewhat more complicated. The risk premium impacts FDI 
directly through (A.13) but, given that 
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the marginal effect of Aaid  will also depend on the risk premium and thus on country-specific 
characteristics.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
investments, but also raises income, domestic savings and domestic investments, which lowers MPK 
and tends to crowd out foreign investments. The total effect of complementary aid is then conditional 
on the existing amount of Aaid . Kaid  does not operate with scale effects, because it has only one 
direct effect on the level of FDI: both are sources for investments in physical capital (along with 
domestic savings), and in a world where the MPK  is pinned down by wr  (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007), 
the relationship between Kaid  and FDI (and savings) is linear (they are substitutes to each other, 
independently of the size of Kaid  in the economy). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Additional tables 
 
Table A.1. Summary statistics 
 
       
 
Obs. Median Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
       
       
Main variables: 
      
fdi 325 9.8 27.4 65.9 -384.9 547.0 
aidK 325 6.5 15.5 40.5 -18.7 442.1 
aidA 325 21.6 39.6 76.5 -12.2 914.4 
aidA* 323 32.2 50.3 79.8 -7.0 926.0 
Pop. growth, n 325 2.3 2.2 1.0 -5.1 7.0 
Savings per capita, S 325 130.4 337.9 559.2 -679.2 4827.0 
GDP per capita, y 325 747.6 1468.7 1706.5 85.8 9127.1 
       
Political risks: 
      
ICRG index 264 60.1 59.7 10.4 27.6 80.6 
Govt. stability 263 8.0 7.7 2.2 2.3 12 
Socio-economic environment 263 5.0 4.9 1.5 1 9 
Investment profile 263 6.0 6.2 1.9 1 11 
Internal conflict 263 8.1 7.8 2.3 0.4 12 
External conflict 263 9.7 9.3 2.0 2.3 12 
Political corruption 263 3.0 2.7 0.9 0 5 
Military in politics 263 3.0 3.0 1.6 0 6 
Religion in politics 263 5.0 4.3 1.4 0 6 
Law and order 263 3.0 3.1 1.1 1 6 
Ethnic tensions 263 4.0 3.8 1.4 0 6 
Democratic accountability 263 3.2 3.2 1.2 0 6 
Bureaucratic quality 263 2.0 1.7 0.9 0 3.5 
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Table A.2. aidA and aidK across time (as % of total aid), and total aid receipts(in USD per capita) 
 
            
 Social 
infrastr
. 
Econ. 
infrastr. 
aidA  Agric., 
forestry
, 
fishing 
Industry, 
mining, 
construct
. 
Trade, 
banking
, 
tourism 
aidK  Total aid 
per capita 
           
           
 (1) (2) (1) + (2)  (a) (b) (c) (a) + (b) + (c)  (USD) 
            
           
1970-74 29.9 32.7 50.4  16.2 17.8 1.8 22.8  372.1 
1975-79 25.1 36.4 50.9  21.2 18.8 5.9 29.0  368.8 
1980-84 22.3 28.8 41.8  19.6 14.4 5.1 28.4  279.5 
1985-89 23.7 26.8 41.6  19.2 14.9 7.4 29.1  369.6 
1990-94 33.8 20.4 51.3  12.2 6.9 2.7 19.5  388.9 
1995-99 42.0 16.5 57.1  9.2 3.5 1.0 12.9  372.0 
2000-01 46.5 13.0 59.4  9.3 3.0 0.8 12.2  112.6 
           
            
All countries (186 countries, 1970-2001): 
 
Median 29.9 26.8 50.9  16.2 14.4 2.7 22.8  369.6 
Average 31.9 24.9 50.4  15.3 11.3 3.5 22.0  323.4 
Std. dev. 9.4 8.6 6.8  5.0 6.7 2.6 7.4  99.6 
Minimum 22.3 13.0 41.6  9.2 3.0 0.8 12.2  112.6 
Maximu
m 
46.5 36.4 59.4  21.2 18.8 7.4 29.1  388.9 
           
            
Main sample (99 countries, 1975-2001): 
 
Median 22.3 22.5 45.1  13.6 6.3 1.1 19.9  88.1 
Average 25.7 22.7 47.6  12.9 6.9 1.7 18.8  91.7 
Std. dev. 12.8 6.2 7.8  3.9 3.8 1.3 5.6  27.3 
Minimum 12.8 14.5 40.1  8.1 3.2 0.6 12.3  51.6 
Maximu
m 
43.5 30.5 58.0  17.5 13.2 3.8 24.7  130.3 
            
Notes. Estimated amount of aidA and aidK, as percentages of total aid commitments. aidA is aid 
financing complementary inputs (projects in social infrastructure, such as education, health, and water 
supply projects; and economic infrastructure, such as energy, transportation and communications 
projects). aidK are aid contributions to directly productive sectors (such as agriculture, manufacturing, 
trade, banking and tourism projects). Total aid disbursements per capita expressed in constant 2000 
US dollars. Estimates based on data from the OECD’s Credit Reporting System and Aid Activity 
database. Data available for 186 developing countries, of which 99 are included in the main sample, 
due to limitations in the availability of other variables. 
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Table A.3. aidA and aidK across countries (as % of total aid), and total aid receipts (in USD per 
capita, 1970-2001) 
 
   
             Social 
infrastr. 
Econ. 
infrastr. 
aidA Agric., 
forestry, 
fishing 
Industry, 
mining, 
construct. 
Trade, 
banking, 
tourism 
aidK Total
aid p. 
capita 
             
             
   (1) (2) (1) + (2)  (a) (b) (c) (a) + (b) + (c)  (USD) 
   
             
           ABW Aruba 25.4 6.0 31.4 
 
0.5 8.1 10.2 17.3 
  × AFG Afghanistan 23.9 7.7 28.1 
 
12.0 2.5 6.1 13.6 
 
9.4
× AGO Angola 22.7 20.2 42.2 
 
9.8 5.2 0.7 13.7 
 
37.2 
 AIA Anguilla 42.1 37.7 75.2 
 
4.2 3.2 15.2 9.1 
  × ALB Albania 37.8 10.1 47.9 
 
5.1 2.7 0.1 7.8 
 
43.5
 ANT Netherlands 
Antilles 56.5 17.3 48.8 
 
0.8 4.5 1.5 5.9 
 
4219.4 
 ARE United Arab 
Emirates 55.0 55.0 65.0 
 
64.5 21.7 
 
73.3 
 
209.4 
× ARG Argentina 21.2 34.8 53.8 
 
35.4 29.1 1.5 43.7 
 
138.1 
× ARM Armenia 32.2 34.9 67.0 
 
3.2 2.0 4.3 9.6 
 
60.7 
 ATG Antigua and 
Barbuda 30.8 30.4 58.4 
 
18.1 21.0 17.7 29.6 
 
544.7 
 AZE Azerbaijan 40.7 32.6 62.9 
 
5.6 3.0 1.6 8.2 
 
10.6 
× BDI Burundi 26.3 20.5 41.4 
 
10.3 6.2 3.0 14.8 
 
36.8 
× BEN Benin 26.9 24.5 51.4 
 
8.8 10.6 1.2 13.7 
 
50.2 
× BFA Burkina Faso 21.3 15.9 37.1 
 
14.1 3.8 2.1 17.7 
 
41.8 
× BGD Bangladesh 15.1 15.8 30.9 
 
10.0 5.0 1.3 15.2 
 
17.1 
× BGR Bulgaria 49.8 14.6 64.3 
 
2.8 3.0 1.1 6.9 
   BHR Bahrain 47.3 10.0 57.3 
 
13.7 35.3 6.7 50.8 
 
755.2
 BHS Bahamas, 
The 68.0 4.2 52.8 
 
0.0 33.3 
 
33.3 
 
2307.7 
 BIH Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 34.7 13.0 54.3 
 
1.4 0.4 0.1 1.9 
 
236.6 
 BLR Belarus 44.7 14.2 58.9 
 
3.5 0.8 0.0 2.5 
   BLZ Belize 29.0 19.3 48.0 
 
15.4 5.6 2.5 19.6 
 
233.1
× BOL Bolivia 22.8 18.4 41.6 
 
12.5 4.8 1.2 17.8 
 
85.6 
× BRA Brazil 24.3 30.7 51.3 
 
13.4 14.0 0.5 26.7 
 
62.8 
 BRB Barbados 36.4 21.7 40.4 
 
9.4 33.0 6.9 34.4 
 
534.6 
 BRN Brunei 
Darussalam 93.1 1.8 84.7 
 
15.5 0.0 6.3 18.6 
 
124.2 
 BTN Bhutan 21.5 21.4 45.3 
 
39.8 10.7 0.3 44.7 
 
61.6 
× BWA Botswana 42.0 24.1 66.0 
 
5.2 3.7 1.3 8.1 
 
148.1 
× CAF Central 
African 
Republic 27.6 41.7 53.5 
 
15.0 8.2 6.8 18.6 
 
56.0 
× CHL Chile 22.6 8.0 32.3 
 
16.9 5.1 0.6 19.6 
 
93.4 
× CHN China 30.9 53.2 68.7 
 
5.8 9.8 2.1 16.5 
 
4.4 
× CIV Cote d'Ivoire 18.9 14.4 29.7 
 
22.6 5.9 0.2 27.2 
 
73.8 
× CMR Cameroon 18.8 29.6 48.4 
 
15.6 1.8 0.3 17.3 
 
55.0 
× COG Congo, Rep. 18.7 27.1 45.8 
 
10.0 9.3 6.9 19.9 
 
118.3 
 COK Cook Islands 39.6 36.6 63.0 
 
23.7 0.5 2.5 24.7 
  × COL Colombia 50.1 17.4 65.4 
 
12.4 5.5 1.5 15.0 
 
32.4
38 
 
 COM Comoros 38.9 31.8 58.7 
 
13.7 5.6 9.6 16.5 
 
132.5 
 CPV Cape Verde 17.1 10.4 27.5 
 
15.2 1.5 2.4 17.5 
 
281.7 
× CRI Costa Rica 30.5 31.1 46.6 
 
11.1 3.1 1.6 12.6 
 
94.4 
 CUB Cuba 45.0 9.5 54.8 
 
6.6 23.4 0.5 21.6 
 
8.8 
 CYM Cayman 
Islands 47.7 74.4 91.9 
  
55.0 
 
55.0 
   CYP Cyprus 51.8 14.6 61.7 
 
10.9 4.7 0.7 11.3 
 
295.7
 CZE Czech 
Republic 58.1 14.3 72.4 
 
2.1 18.8 0.6 21.1 
   DJI Djibouti 44.5 35.2 74.9 
 
4.5 0.8 0.1 5.2 
 
304.0
 DMA Dominica 25.8 19.4 47.4 
 
26.4 2.1 4.3 26.0 
 
383.0 
× DOM Dominican 
Republic 24.1 22.9 49.0 
 
28.7 7.4 1.5 34.3 
 
39.6 
× DZA Algeria 20.8 31.2 53.9 
 
7.9 14.0 0.1 17.8 
 
76.3 
× ECU Ecuador 22.2 33.6 60.3 
 
19.7 4.3 0.8 20.3 
 
48.9 
× EGY Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 19.7 19.9 38.5 
 
5.4 9.0 0.7 13.7 
 
81.4 
× ERI Eritrea 32.5 4.9 36.2 
 
8.8 4.3 0.2 13.1 
 
43.5 
 EST Estonia 43.9 26.9 54.1 
 
5.5 3.5 0.7 9.4 
  × ETH Ethiopia 22.2 9.7 30.8 
 
15.8 2.9 0.2 18.0 
 
14.6
 FJI Fiji 50.3 13.7 60.9 
 
16.1 10.7 1.2 24.7 
 
97.5 
 FLK Falkland 
Islands 
(Malvinas) 69.2 93.6 100.0 
        FSM Micronesia, 
Fed. Sts. 16.6 21.0 37.5 
 
28.0 1.3 0.4 29.4 
 
737.1 
× GAB Gabon 29.5 22.0 50.0 
 
19.4 7.6 3.0 23.3 
 
338.2 
× GEO Georgia 23.8 24.3 48.1 
 
3.7 1.5 4.6 7.1 
 
37.0 
× GHA Ghana 26.6 22.2 53.7 
 
8.6 3.3 1.0 10.8 
 
35.9 
 GIB Gibraltar 56.0 31.1 37.7 
 
2.8 
 
1.5 2.1 
  × GIN Guinea 18.9 21.5 46.1 
 
13.9 3.2 2.0 17.2 
 
45.1
× GMB Gambia, The 24.7 21.0 38.9 
 
22.8 3.1 3.0 24.4 
 
91.4 
× GNB Guinea-
Bissau 29.9 9.5 38.1 
 
10.7 5.9 1.4 16.9 
 
96.7 
 GNQ Equatorial 
Guinea 40.8 18.4 61.5 
 
17.8 3.0 0.0 18.6 
 
90.3 
 GRD Grenada 43.6 22.2 74.5 
 
40.8 4.6 29.8 42.5 
 
161.1 
× GTM Guatemala 33.9 16.3 48.6 
 
14.2 7.4 0.2 17.3 
 
33.0 
 GUY Guyana 14.3 29.5 44.0 
 
22.6 2.6 4.7 26.5 
 
124.7 
 HKG Hong Kong, 
China 74.4 13.8 91.7 
 
0.0 32.4 2.5 33.4 
 
369.7 
× HND Honduras 24.4 21.7 42.6 
 
20.3 2.1 1.6 22.5 
 
74.6 
× HRV Croatia 38.2 13.9 63.7 
 
2.4 14.2 2.5 17.4 
 
149.7 
× HTI Haiti 30.0 21.1 49.0 
 
15.4 0.9 0.5 16.1 
 
34.0 
 HUN Hungary 60.3 37.6 66.7 
 
1.2 2.7 3.5 7.4 
  × IDN Indonesia 15.9 32.0 47.9 
 
8.4 9.3 0.4 18.0 
 
27.9
× IND India 17.5 25.2 42.7 
 
10.5 11.3 0.4 22.0 
 
4.6 
× IRN Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 57.1 24.4 83.3 
 
10.3 45.5 0.4 41.6 
 
16.8 
 IRQ Iraq 46.7 50.0 5.5 
 
17.6 80.3 
 
37.8 
 
19.2 
 ISR Israel 13.3 7.6 24.1 
 
1.2 5.7 0.1 5.1 
 
618.6 
× JAM Jamaica 27.0 11.2 38.5 
 
10.9 3.6 0.7 14.1 
 
142.4 
× JOR Jordan 22.7 20.8 43.6 
 
9.2 8.4 1.9 15.5 
 
385.2 
× KAZ Kazakhstan 41.8 47.2 76.1 
 
2.5 5.5 9.2 17.1 
 
33.2 
× KEN Kenya 31.9 20.6 52.5 
 
13.3 4.4 0.5 18.0 
 
42.0 
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× KGZ Kyrgyz 
Republic 25.9 16.3 42.2 
 
5.4 3.6 1.1 10.1 
 
38.8 
× KHM Cambodia 24.8 11.8 36.4 
 
5.1 0.5 0.3 5.5 
 
25.9 
 KIR Kiribati 40.7 15.9 55.0 
 
24.1 13.4 2.2 28.2 
 
281.4 
 KNA St. Kitts and 
Nevis 33.6 24.0 48.5 
 
24.9 20.2 1.1 29.1 
 
128.9 
 KOR Korea, Rep. 51.6 6.4 63.1 
 
7.5 7.2 0.6 12.5 
 
75.4 
 KWT Kuwait 93.6 0.0 80.8 
  
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
119.4 
× LAO Lao PDR 19.3 30.1 45.4 
 
21.7 4.7 0.2 21.9 
 
46.7 
× LBN Lebanon 35.4 11.4 62.9 
 
3.5 9.8 0.5 8.5 
 
75.1 
 LBR Liberia 21.5 20.2 43.9 
 
11.6 2.4 2.4 10.0 
 
208.5 
 LBY Libya 48.3 0.0 67.9 
 
0.0 
  
0.0 
 
89.8 
 LCA St. Lucia 38.3 28.8 49.1 
 
27.5 18.9 0.0 34.8 
 
162.2 
× LKA Sri Lanka 17.3 30.5 47.6 
 
10.4 7.0 0.4 15.9 
 
36.9 
 LSO Lesotho 33.7 19.1 47.7 
 
14.0 3.1 0.3 16.2 
 
85.0 
 LTU Lithuania 26.9 33.3 60.2 
 
5.3 7.4 0.9 13.7 
   LVA Latvia 41.4 42.2 65.2 
 
3.9 3.8 1.8 7.3 
   MAC Macao, 
China 83.3 
        
26.9 
× MAR Morocco 20.0 19.4 40.4 
 
14.7 19.5 0.7 23.4 
 
59.2 
 MDA Moldova 19.5 28.2 47.8 
 
1.5 2.6 14.2 18.0 
 
14.0 
× MDG Madagascar 13.9 28.9 42.9 
 
16.8 4.0 2.1 21.1 
 
36.5 
 MDV Maldives 34.8 25.7 59.4 
 
24.8 13.4 0.0 24.6 
 
109.7 
× MEX Mexico 44.2 37.1 61.2 
 
12.6 15.2 8.7 25.6 
 
68.7 
 MHL Marshall 
Islands 23.1 9.4 32.3 
 
28.1 8.8 
 
33.7 
 
2663.5 
× MKD Macedonia, 
FYR 35.6 10.4 46.0 
 
8.9 1.8 0.5 9.9 
 
77.4 
× MLI Mali 24.8 15.9 40.6 
 
16.0 3.4 1.0 19.1 
 
51.5 
 MLT Malta 32.8 28.5 58.1 
 
15.7 12.2 0.4 16.1 
 
591.9 
 MMR Myanmar 12.4 16.0 28.4 
 
9.0 17.7 0.5 25.2 
 
8.4 
× MNG Mongolia 37.7 33.9 59.0 
 
6.0 21.6 0.5 25.9 
 
40.3 
 MNP Northern 
Mariana 
Islands 68.7 16.6 44.3 
 
49.6 18.2 
 
52.0 
  × MOZ Mozambique 17.7 15.3 31.5 
 
9.9 3.0 0.2 12.7 
 
48.1
× MRT Mauritania 20.9 9.6 28.8 
 
19.4 8.1 1.1 26.3 
 
150.4 
 MSR Montserrat 38.2 33.2 55.5 
 
7.4 12.5 2.7 14.4 
  × MUS Mauritius 42.0 28.4 65.8 
 
14.9 3.9 4.9 16.0 
 
144.6
× MWI Malawi 23.4 31.6 56.3 
 
10.8 2.4 0.7 12.0 
 
47.6 
× MYS Malaysia 23.2 54.8 71.5 
 
5.0 17.7 0.7 22.0 
 
80.2 
 MYT Mayotte 91.9 25.8 93.8 
 
5.7 
  
5.7 
  × NAM Namibia 53.0 37.6 69.4 
 
8.4 3.6 0.3 11.4 
 
37.5
 NCL New 
Caledonia 51.9 49.1 92.4 
 
6.6 19.9 2.0 16.3 
 
1778.1 
× NER Niger 24.8 13.0 35.8 
 
16.7 4.6 0.7 20.7 
 
52.2 
× NGA Nigeria 34.1 22.2 59.7 
 
17.6 4.7 0.8 20.7 
 
10.9 
× NIC Nicaragua 26.1 19.5 44.4 
 
10.2 9.8 0.2 17.6 
 
98.4 
 NIU Niue 33.6 36.5 71.6 
 
12.3 
 
5.1 9.2 
  × NPL Nepal 21.9 35.4 57.3 
 
15.6 6.8 0.4 20.4 
 
19.4
 NRU Nauru 22.8 2.5 59.0 
 
25.0 3.3 0.0 25.0 
  × OMN Oman 42.9 15.7 31.1 
 
37.2 32.4 1.2 60.4 
 
170.6
× PAK Pakistan 11.9 24.7 36.5 
 
10.9 3.3 0.2 14.3 
 
18.1 
× PAN Panama 41.0 18.3 52.6 
 
27.1 3.7 7.6 30.1 
 
875.9 
× PER Peru 21.5 13.1 36.5 
 
14.8 6.5 0.3 19.8 
 
54.7 
40 
 
× PHL Philippines 14.5 40.2 54.5 
 
10.3 6.2 1.0 16.6 
 
37.3 
 PLW Palau 7.0 48.7 55.7 
 
18.4 0.3 1.6 19.7 
  × PNG Papua New 
Guinea 27.4 21.8 42.5 
 
3.4 3.4 0.1 4.7 
 
187.3 
 POL Poland 33.2 28.0 39.5 
 
3.6 10.9 5.8 16.7 
   PRK Korea, Dem. 
Rep. 39.1 3.5 11.8 
 
2.3 0.5 0.1 2.4 
 
2.6 
× PRY Paraguay 24.5 46.0 64.2 
 
28.9 10.2 0.1 34.5 
 
44.1 
 PYF French 
Polynesia 60.7 35.5 81.8 
 
7.4 2.1 7.1 8.2 
 
1760.7 
 QAT Qatar 70.4 2.3 72.8 
 
19.5 10.8 0.0 40.4 
 
337.0 
× ROM Romania 46.0 21.5 53.7 
 
4.3 1.1 6.5 8.8 
  × RUS Russian 
Federation 33.2 34.9 53.1 
 
0.8 1.8 5.4 7.5 
 
0.2 
× RWA Rwanda 24.2 19.8 41.6 
 
14.6 2.1 2.6 17.2 
 
51.3 
× SAU Saudi Arabia 60.1 29.1 61.7 
 
3.3 64.4 2.3 66.5 
 
29.8 
× SDN Sudan 13.1 15.0 27.5 
 
9.5 1.0 0.1 9.0 
 
38.6 
× SEN Senegal 24.4 11.1 35.6 
 
17.5 4.2 0.4 21.6 
 
91.0 
 SGP Singapore 40.4 30.9 62.2 
 
3.7 45.0 10.4 53.1 
 
399.7 
 SHN Saint Helena, 
Ascension 
and Tristan 
da Cunha 43.7 28.3 62.4 
 
11.3 7.3 1.0 14.3 
   SLB Solomon 
Islands 36.7 12.7 47.6 
 
24.9 13.2 6.2 31.4 
 
196.9 
× SLE Sierra Leone 17.8 19.7 36.3 
 
6.8 3.9 0.5 8.5 
 
34.1 
× SLV El Salvador 31.6 21.6 53.8 
 
20.9 8.3 0.7 24.9 
 
70.2 
 SOM Somalia 18.8 11.9 29.9 
 
9.8 18.2 0.1 15.7 
 
66.7 
 STP Sao Tome 
and Principe 28.3 11.5 42.8 
 
34.6 0.9 0.7 35.2 
 
274.4 
 SUR Suriname 55.8 20.2 58.9 
 
4.3 0.4 0.1 4.5 
 
239.5 
 SVK Slovak 
Republic 52.4 15.4 67.8 
 
1.8 3.1 5.6 10.4 
   SVN Slovenia 46.5 22.5 72.6 
 
0.3 23.6 1.1 24.6 
 
171.9
 SWZ Swaziland 41.3 20.3 61.2 
 
15.8 10.5 1.9 24.2 
 
94.5 
 SYC Seychelles 34.0 13.1 42.8 
 
24.9 4.3 9.5 29.5 
 
623.0 
× SYR Syrian Arab 
Republic 24.3 43.3 64.4 
 
30.8 3.1 0.3 27.7 
 
103.7 
 TCA Turks and 
Caicos 
Islands 36.3 26.5 64.5 
 
8.6 3.9 67.4 24.5 
  × TCD Chad 23.4 14.4 40.7 
 
16.9 4.0 2.2 19.6 
 
36.1
× TGO Togo 24.6 23.0 46.5 
 
12.6 5.8 0.1 16.7 
 
59.1 
× THA Thailand 15.9 54.6 70.2 
 
14.0 9.1 1.1 22.2 
 
46.4 
× TJK Tajikistan 24.0 10.5 34.4 
 
1.1 4.0 10.2 14.9 
 
18.6 
 TKL Tokelau 73.7 44.6 80.4 
 
100.0 0.0 
 
50.0 
   TKM Turkmenistan 31.9 9.8 41.7 
  
6.6 0.0 6.6 
 
29.7
 TMP Timor-Leste 50.5 0.8 43.9 
 
7.1 25.2 4.9 22.3 
 
11 
 TON Tonga 44.4 25.2 61.6 
 
18.6 13.2 1.0 24.0 
 
194.7 
× TTO Trinidad and 
Tobago 32.8 46.7 48.8 
 
49.7 19.0 1.0 51.0 
 
77.4 
× TUN Tunisia 18.6 23.4 42.0 
 
11.7 14.6 1.6 26.0 
 
98.2 
× TUR Turkey 24.8 30.3 51.9 
 
4.5 6.9 0.1 11.3 
 
54.3 
 TUV Tuvalu 35.0 23.3 60.4 
 
21.4 2.5 2.9 22.2 
   TWN Taiwan 89.6 0.4 86.4 
 
1.1 27.9 0.3 28.3 
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× TZA Tanzania 25.8 19.7 45.5 
 
9.5 7.6 0.4 17.5 
 
44.4 
× UGA Uganda 36.4 15.8 40.2 
 
8.2 22.5 2.8 30.0 
 
24.9 
× UKR Ukraine 44.9 34.2 62.4 
 
4.0 17.8 0.6 21.7 
  × URY Uruguay 44.2 17.3 47.0 
 
24.6 14.8 1.7 35.6 
 
74.4
× UZB Uzbekistan 48.9 24.0 72.9 
 
5.2 5.4 3.7 15.5 
 
10.2 
 VCT St. Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 41.5 29.1 51.0 
 
34.6 7.0 4.3 31.4 
 
168.5 
× VEN Venezuela, 
RB 56.3 40.7 71.1 
 
11.7 14.2 0.7 21.1 
 
64.1 
 VIR Virgin 
Islands (U.S.) 51.6 30.5 72.4 
 
10.4 9.1 8.3 13.4 
 
5079.0 
× VNM Vietnam 27.0 21.1 44.7 
 
6.5 29.3 0.4 35.3 
 
16.3 
 VUT Vanuatu 34.1 16.3 50.0 
 
14.5 1.8 9.0 16.9 
 
362.0 
 WLF Wallis and 
Futuna 67.1 2.6 96.1 
 
35.3 
  
35.3 
   WSM Samoa 41.4 39.6 69.1 
 
16.9 2.2 1.2 18.7 
 
243.9
 XPA Palestinian 
Adm. Areas 73.2 13.0 74.4 
 
2.8 4.3 0.4 5.6 
  × YEM Yemen, Rep. 28.3 27.7 50.9 
 
14.5 7.9 0.0 17.2 
 
54.0
 YUG Serbia and 
Montenegro 58.0 12.9 52.7 
 
0.8 0.5 0.1 1.3 
 
45.4 
× ZAF South Africa 77.1 10.1 78.5 
 
2.5 2.9 0.7 5.8 
 
29.1 
× ZAR Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 18.0 25.3 43.4 
 
5.8 2.6 0.1 8.1 
 
27.0 
 ZMB Zambia 21.7 18.2 39.9 
 
12.4 4.9 0.8 16.9 
 
94.2 
× ZWE Zimbabwe 38.9 15.6 54.6 
 
8.0 4.3 1.0 12.3 
 
42.1 
   
             
          All countries (186 countries, 1970-2001): 
 
Number of countries 186 185 185 
 
181 179 173 184 
 
167 
Median 33.0 21.4 51.9 
 
10.9 5.5 1.0 17.8 
 
62.8 
Average 36.0 23.3 53.3 
 
13.6 9.5 2.8 20.3 
 
219.6 
Standard deviation 17.1 13.5 16.0 
 
12.2 11.5 6.2 12.5 
 
602.7 
Minimum 7.0 0.0 5.5 
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
0.0 
Maximum 93.6 93.6 100.0 
 
100.0 80.3 67.4 73.3 
 
5079.0 
   
             
          Main sample (99 countries, 1975-2001): 
 
Number of countries 99 99 99 
 
99 99 98 99 
 
99 
Median 32.0 14.7 52.2 
 
9.5 3.0 0.5 13.5 
 
47.6 
Average 34.9 18.8 53.3 
 
10.3 4.8 1.0 15.2 
 
72.2 
Standard deviation 13.0 12.2 15.3 
 
6.7 5.8 1.5 9.5 
 
112.6 
Minimum 13.2 0.3 22.1 
 
0.4 0.0 0.0 2.1 
 
0.0 
Maximum 70.0 51.6 86.1 
 
38.0 42.4 8.7 62.3 
 
998.7 
   
          Notes. × = included in the final sample. Estimated amount of aidA and aidK, as percentages of total aid 
commitments. aidA is aid financing complementary inputs (projects in social infrastructure, such as 
education, health, and water supply projects; and economic infrastructure, such as energy, 
transportation and communications projects). aidK are aid contributions to directly productive sectors 
(such as agriculture, manufacturing, trade, banking and tourism projects). Total aid disbursements per 
capita expressed in constant 2000 US dollars. Estimates based on data from the OECD’s Credit 
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Reporting System and Aid Activity database. Data available for 186 developing countries, of which 99 
are included in the main sample, due to limitations in the availability of other variables. 
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Table A.4. Main sample (99 countries, 1975-2001) 
 
        
  
75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-01 
        
        
AFG Afghanistan × 
     
ALB Albania 
     
× 
DZA Algeria × × × × × × 
AGO Angola 
    
× × 
ARG Argentina 
 
× × × × × 
ARM Armenia 
     
× 
BGD Bangladesh 
    
× × 
BEN Benin 
 
× × × × × 
BOL Bolivia 
  
× × × × 
BWA Botswana 
 
× × × × × 
BRA Brazil × × × × × × 
BGR Bulgaria 
     
× 
BFA Burkina Faso × × × × × × 
BDI Burundi 
   
× × × 
KHM Cambodia 
     
× 
CMR Cameroon × × × × × × 
CAF Central African Republic 
 
× × × × × 
TCD Chad 
 
× × × × × 
CHL Chile 
 
× × × × × 
CHN China 
  
× × × × 
COL Colombia × × × × × × 
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. 
    
× × 
COG Congo, Rep. 
   
× × × 
CRI Costa Rica 
 
× × × × × 
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 
   
× × × 
HRV Croatia 
     
× 
DOM Dominican Republic 
    
× × 
ECU Ecuador 
  
× × × 
 
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. 
 
× × × × × 
SLV El Salvador 
    
× × 
ERI Eritrea 
     
× 
ETH Ethiopia 
 
× × × × × 
GAB Gabon 
 
× × × × × 
GMB Gambia, The 
    
× × 
GEO Georgia 
     
× 
GHA Ghana 
    
× × 
GTM Guatemala 
  
× × × × 
GIN Guinea 
   
× × × 
GNB Guinea-Bissau 
     
× 
HTI Haiti 
  
× × × × 
HND Honduras 
  
× × × × 
IND India × × × × × × 
IDN Indonesia 
  
× × × × 
IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. 
    
× × 
JAM Jamaica 
    
× × 
JOR Jordan × × × × × × 
KAZ Kazakhstan 
    
× × 
KEN Kenya 
 
× × × × × 
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic 
     
× 
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LAO Lao PDR 
    
× × 
LBN Lebanon 
   
× × × 
MKD Macedonia, FYR 
     
× 
MDG Madagascar 
   
× × 
 
MWI Malawi 
     
× 
MYS Malaysia 
  
× × × × 
MLI Mali 
   
× × × 
MRT Mauritania 
   
× × × 
MUS Mauritius 
   
× × × 
MEX Mexico 
 
× × × × × 
MNG Mongolia 
    
× × 
MAR Morocco 
   
× × × 
MOZ Mozambique 
   
× × × 
NAM Namibia 
    
× × 
NPL Nepal × × × × × × 
NIC Nicaragua 
  
× × × × 
NER Niger × × × × × × 
NGA Nigeria 
 
× 
  
× × 
OMN Oman 
    
× × 
PAK Pakistan × × × × × × 
PAN Panama 
  
× × × × 
PNG Papua New Guinea 
 
× × × × 
 
PRY Paraguay 
 
× × × × × 
PER Peru 
  
× × × × 
PHL Philippines 
 
× × × × × 
ROM Romania 
    
× 
 
RUS Russian Federation 
    
× 
 
RWA Rwanda 
 
× × × × × 
SAU Saudi Arabia 
    
× × 
SEN Senegal × × × × × × 
SLE Sierra Leone 
   
× × 
 
ZAF South Africa 
    
× × 
LKA Sri Lanka 
   
× × × 
SDN Sudan × × × 
 
× × 
SYR Syrian Arab Republic 
   
× × × 
TJK Tajikistan 
    
× 
 
TZA Tanzania 
   
× × × 
THA Thailand 
 
× × × × × 
TGO Togo 
   
× × × 
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 
     
× 
TUN Tunisia × × × × × × 
TUR Turkey 
  
× × × × 
UGA Uganda 
    
× × 
UKR Ukraine 
     
× 
URY Uruguay 
     
× 
UZB Uzbekistan 
    
× × 
VEN Venezuela, RB 
   
× × × 
VNM Vietnam 
  
× × × × 
YEM Yemen, Rep. 
   
× × × 
ZWE Zimbabwe 
  
× × × × 
        
Notes. Aid data available for 186 developing countries from the OECD Credit Reporting System and 
Aid Activity databases, of which 99 are included in the main sample, due to limitations in the 
availability of other variables. 
 
